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Abstract
Emotions have always been invested in politics. Politicians and politically biased public intellectuals manage citizens’ emo‐
tions for various purposes: to alienate them from the rival political camp and to make them participate in elections or in
politics in general. Ressentiment is an affective style of great political potential and it is present throughout democratic
European societies. By analysing the discourses of the culture war between the political camps in Hungary since 2018,
this article presents the components, drivers, mechanisms, and some typical outcomes of ressentiment on the levels of
the individual and the political communities. It argues that in political communication both political sides are trying to
appeal to the citizens’ ressentiment. Both camps use communicative means to incite, channel, and reorient ressentiment
by, e.g., scapegoating, identity work, and transvaluation to attract citizens, stabilize their own support, and nudge follow‐
ers towards specific political activities.
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1. Introduction
Political communication has always been used to man‐
age emotions. Plato underlined the dangers of dema‐
goguery, Aristotle, in turn, advised on how to influence
emotions, reasoning that “the emotions are all those
affections which cause men to change their opinion
in regard to their judgements” (Aristotle, 1990, 1378a).
Recently, particularly since the reception of Damasio’s
works (1994) by the social sciences, political science
and political communication studies have extensively
scrutinized the links between emotions and politics
(e.g., Braud, 1996; Demertzis, 2013). A great number of
projects dealt with the incitement of fear (e.g., Mack,
2004; Wodak, 2015), anger (Hochschild, 2016; Mishra,
2017), and hope (Brader, 2006) by parties and politicians,
particularly during campaigns. A remarkable character‐
istic of the research so far is the dominance of studies
on basic or primary emotions (TenHouten, 2007) such as
fear, anger, or joy. Some have studied secondary emo‐
tions, such as hatred or hope, but more complex emo‐
tions or affective states in politics are seldom analysed
(e.g., Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Ciulla, 2020; Hoggett,
2018; Hoggett et al., 2013; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017,
2018; TenHouten, 2018; Wimberly, 2018).
The present article deals with the political communi‐
cations management of one of the most complex affec‐
tive mechanisms: ressentiment. Ressentiment is a sub‐
jectively unpleasant emotional state, a specific affective
style that makes people inclined to focus on painful
developments and also to feel powerless to repair them.
In a therapeutic culture (Aubry & Travis, 2015; Illouz,
2008) where not only hearts are managed but selves
are also outsourced (Hochschild, 1983, 2012), it is hardly
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surprising that citizens also turn to professional polit‐
ical communicators for healing (Sointu & Hill, 2020).
Plato thought that politics is for the soul what gym‐
nastics and medicine are for the body (Plato, 1967,
464b), and Goethe warned against turning society into
a hospital where citizens are sick‐nurses to each other
(Scheler, 1912/2018, p. 54). Particularly under the condi‐
tions where social media make interaction and two‐way
political communication between professional communi‐
cators and citizens a part of everyday politics, citizens
may look for public figures who perceptibly empathize
with them, who help them alleviate frustration and
discontent by offering explanations, enemies to blame,
values to follow, and ways of action to gain relief.
Sometimes professional communicators play the thera‐
peutic role unconsciously: They offer metaphors and nar‐
ratives, their own authentic or fake emotions and, on
being favourably received, they deploy them recurrently
not knowing that the favourable reception springs from
deep‐seated ressentiment present among the citizens.
This article, therefore, analyses which components
of the political communications processes in the public
sphere lend themselves to public communicators (politi‐
cians, journalists, and further actors such as comment‐
ing citizens) to allow them to take advantage of the
ressentiment that is likely present in the emotional realm
of the audience. Consciously or unconsciously, political
communicators incite, appease, or orient; in short: They
manage the emotions of audiences as well as the mech‐
anisms covered by the concept of ressentiment. The arti‐
cle will present the discourses and issues offered by
communicators that help citizens alleviate the unpleas‐
ant feelings stemming from ressentiment, by, e.g., exter‐
nalizing the urges that they feel threatened, by giving
objects to their hatred, and by transforming ressenti‐
ment’s components (which would make them politically
passive) into anger whereby they may turn towards par‐
ticipation in politics (Ost, 2004).
The article also claims that ressentiment can multi‐
ply in a society; one may speak, therefore, about double
ressentiment too. Since ressentimentmay arise from per‐
ceived injuries in various fields, specific groups of polit‐
ical communicators may try to represent and manage
the emotions of specific groups of citizens with specific
ressentiments based on the perceived hurts and pow‐
erlessness in respective fields. As the article will show,
some political communicators may take advantage of
ressentiment springing from recurrent political failure,
while others handle impotent revenge due to felt cul‐
tural inferiority.
The article presents the political communication tar‐
geted at ressentiment using the case of Kulturkampf in
Hungary in the period from 2018 to 2020. Although the
concept of Kulturkampf originally covered the struggle
between state and church in Germany in the second half
of the 19th century (Clark & Kaiser, 2009), today it signi‐
fies any cultural fight between political forces. Recently
it has been applied to label the conflict between the
American Democrats and Republicans on moral and cul‐
tural issues, such as abortion or gay marriage (Chapman,
2010), the conflict between Labour and the mainstream
press in the UK (Curran et al., 2019), and it has also been
used in France (Brustier, 2013) and Spain (Ibañez, 2020)
and applied to Occidentalism, regarding the future of the
West and its enemies. Kulturkampf, or at least cultural
threat, in parallel with economic difficulties, seems to
have played a special role in the rise of populist parties
throughout Europe (Ferrari, 2021).
I proceed by reviewing research on ressentiment:
How the concept has been used to understand politics.
In the third section, I describe the political context in
Hungary including the historical experiences that make
the presence of ressentiment in the country probable.
I then introduce the theoretical framework offered by
the concept to detect the components of the political
communication efforts that may appeal to ressentiment.
Subsequently, I describe the sources and methods used
to collect and analyse the data. Then, I explicate the
empirical results, that is, the political communications
methods that may have proved useful to manage the cit‐
izens’ ressentiment. Finally, I discuss these findings.
2. Ressentiment from Culture to Political Sentiment
Although the concept of ressentiment had been used pre‐
viously (van Tuinen, 2020), the most important source
of its modern version is Nietzsche (1887/1994) who put
it into the centre of the European culture defining it as
the psychic foundation of Christianity, the morality of
the slaves, and a characteristic of the weak and impo‐
tent. Scheler (1912/2018) considered ressentiment the
almost inevitable effect of the discrepancy between the
ideology and the reality of democracy. Democratic ideol‐
ogy makes people believe that everybody is equal, and
some have more power and fortune only because they
are more gifted. One may, however, have the experience
that worthless people climb high in the economic and
political hierarchy, without any mechanism to redress
such undeserved success, which fills one with resent‐
ment and, if the feeling is recurrent, with ressentiment.
The concept has proved to have great potential in
explaining movements and revolutions in history (Burrin,
2007; Ferro, 2007) as well as more specific issues (e.g.,
Ball, 1964), one of them being populism (Fassin, 2017;
Fleury, 2020). The connection had been foreseen by
Sennett (1974/1986), but the real renaissance began
with the strengthening of the new forces later called pop‐
ulists and especially after the middle of 2016, that is,
in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum and Donald
Trump’s victory in the US.
Salmela and von Scheve (2017, 2018) found fear,
insecurity, disappointment, and distrust lead to ressen‐
timent, and they defined envy, hatred and, in the case
of right‐wing populism, also shame as its drivers and out‐
comes.With shame included and leaning on Scheff’s the‐
ory of shame/anger (Scheff, 1990, 1994), the approach
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was able to explain how shameful citizens move from
negative and therefore rather discouraging emotions to
anger, that is, the emotional background of action—
crucial in politics. Salmela and Capelos (2021), in turn,
define ressentiment as the affective core of reactionism,
which leads towards nostalgic political activities against
outgroups and minorities. Capelos and Demertzis (2018)
focused specifically on populist and reactionary politi‐
cal behaviour and the role ressentiment played there.
They defined ressentiment as the combination of anger
or anxiety with low political efficacy, the perception
of powerlessness.
A special part of the literature is about the ways
politicians have tried to elicit or take advantage of
ressentiment among the people.Wimberly (2018) claims
that Donald Trump was efficient in offering citizens
ways to vent their ressentiment onto the professional
class. With professionals being mediators between the
people and the elites, citizens may have felt Trump
more authentic than the rest of the politicians, being
a person who turned against professionals just as they
were happy to do. Kelly (2020) theorizes that ressen‐
timent explains the apparent contradiction in Donald
Trump’s communication between toughness and self‐
victimization, and Dolgert (2016) revaluates the political
potential of ressentiment and suggests that the political
left also should manage the affect in its own interest.
Dolgert’s approach is specifically relevant for the present
research because it is based on the idea of parallel or
double ressentiment: Communicators belonging to dif‐
ferent political camps may manage the same ressenti‐
ment among citizens to reach their own goals.
3. The Political Context in Hungary
The concept of ressentiment has been used by historians
to shed light on Hungary’s past. It was applied to explain
antisemitism in the 19th and 20th centuries: Unable
to adjust to the requirements of capitalism and seeing
Jews get rich and advance socially, Christian Hungarians
felt ressentiment and nurtured hatred against the pros‐
pering minority (Szabó, 1981). Ressentiment has also
proven fruitful in understanding the regime prior to 1990
(Majtényi, 2012). János Kádár, the leader of the country
from 1956 to 1988, was the politician of ressentiment
because he was constructed as embodying the impotent
vengefulness against the Russian oppression.
Just as in the case of France in the 18th century
(Greenfeld, 1992) or Poland recently (Kazlauskaite &
Salmela, in press), since 1990, a significant proportion of
Hungarians may have felt ressentiment due to the coun‐
try persistently lagging behind Western Europe. That
frustration explains the disparaging of western values
in general and the so‐called European values in partic‐
ular: The less one is successful in realizing them, the
more one might appreciate the specific national values
instead of facing failure and drifting towards shame and
self‐loathing. Ressentiment, hence, seems to be persis‐
tent in the Hungarian mentality either because of the
Christian culture, or because of the inherent tension
between equality and undeserved prosperity by some in
democracy, or because of the perceived recurrent failure
to come up to the West’s standards.
Still, the summer of 2018 can definitely be regarded
as the beginning of a new phase in the Hungarian ressen‐
timent and its management. By 2018, Viktor Orbán had
won all the parliamentary, local, and European elections
since the autumn of 2006, reaching, e.g., a two‐thirds
majority in the parliament, and according to the opin‐
ion polls, his party (Fidesz) had been the most popu‐
lar for twelve years. As early as 2009, he foresaw the
radical transformation of culture if the political and eco‐
nomic transformations his future parliamentary major‐
ity was to implement proved successful. In 2010, he
started to restructure the regime (Körösényi et al., 2020)
on the premise that the liberal democracy built on the
implicit negotiations within the elite had failed politically
as well as economically. It failed politically in 2006 when
unprecedented riots took place in Budapest because
of a leaked secret speech in which the Socialist Prime
Minister of the period from 2004 to 2009 confessed that
his government had been lying to the citizens instead
of governing the country; and liberal democratic regime
had failed economically even before the world crisis
of 2008 which then aggravated the difficulties. Since
politics and economics are in interaction with culture,
according to Orbán, a new political and economic sys‐
tem should result in a new cultural atmosphere and sit‐
uation including a rearranged system of cultural institu‐
tions more favourable to the political right. Practically,
indeed, the governance of the political right restructured
the political system and regime during the first period
from 2010 to 2014 and finished the economic transfor‐
mation by the end of the second period from 2014 to
2018. The three parliamentary electoral victories in a
row seemed to have grounded the implementation of
Orbán’s vision regarding culture.
The 2009 plans were repeated and confirmed in the
prime minister’s speech of late July 2018. Viktor Orbán
announced that the government should be crowned by
the transformation of culture. The speech was reflected
upon by a great number of articles and media pro‐
grammes and a series of legislative steps and personnel
reshuffling in the realm of culture followed. The reac‐
tions on both political sides after the speech labelled
the debates as part of an age‐long cultural war, and fre‐
quently used the noun Kulturkampf and its Hungarian
version kultúrharc.
The call by Orbán and the expansion of the politi‐
cal right in culture was highly appreciated in the prime
minister’s camp but, even as late as 2020, by when the
government’s appointees had occupied the leading posi‐
tions, the right‐wing journalists and public intellectuals
still complained about the continuing cultural hegemony
of the liberals and the political left. The latter, in turn,
claimed that, quite to the contrary, it was the political
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right which dominated culture, although the country had
one single cultural elite, which always came from the
political left; the political right, therefore, had neither
real culture, nor valuable artists, and, moreover, the
rightist politicians were culturally backward. Thus, the
left and the liberals should rule politics as well because
only they are progressive and European enough to adjust
to international tendencies.
Each elite, hence, accused the other of undeservedly
keeping culture in general and cultural policy occupied.
The favourable reception by the audiences, and, there‐
fore, the systematic repetitions of conspicuous contradic‐
tions, mutual accusations, self‐victimization, hatred, and
relentlessness by both sides indicate that the commu‐
nicators were successfully targeting audiences presum‐
ably overwhelmedby somedeep‐seated emotional state.
What one sees is not only the incitement of grievance,
anger, fear, envy, or hatred separately but the politi‐
cal management of a complex constellation of emotions
that nurtures an enduring conflict. The recurrent charac‐
ter of the elites’ emotional management efforts and the
specific emotions they focused on implied that what was
invested is entrenched ressentiment.
4. Analytical Framework
In the following, first I define the hypothesis for the
analysis. Second, I outline a specific definition of ressen‐
timent, its components and effects, that is, I intro‐
duce the terminology necessary to test the hypoth‐
esis. Since the research aimed at clarifying emotion
management, in this part I will also introduce the
possible ways and means political communicators can
apply to incite, appease, or channel emotions stemming
from ressentiment.
4.1. The Hypothesis
As the works by Nietzsche, Scheler, and recent schol‐
ars (Hungarian historians included) suggest, in societies
permeated by Christian culture and democratic ideol‐
ogy, and which are lagging behind, ressentiment is perva‐
sive and confirmed regularly by emotional episodes that
make it generic. Although so far theories have defined
single ressentiments that single subjects or social groups
maintain towards another person or group, it is relevant
to study where and in what social spheres such episodes
take place: Unfolding in a specific social realm, they may
contribute to the ressentiment nurtured by a specific
group or segment of the people towards specific oth‐
ers. Accordingly, the hypothesis of double ressentiment
is as follows:
The political communication on Kulturkampf takes
advantage of specific ressentiments twopolitical com‐
munities have towards each other and feed on expe‐
riences in separate spheres.
The hypothesis suggests that both groups may suffer
from impotent revengefulness and, moreover, they may
feel hurt by the other, either in the same or in differ‐
ent fields.
4.2. Definitions
To test the hypothesis, I define themain concepts: ressen‐
timent, its drivers and outcomes in the public sphere, and
the ways in which political communication studies can
detect them.
4.2.1. Ressentiment as an Affective Style
In this research, ressentiment is an affective style.
Although originally defined within neuroscience
(Davidson, 1998), the concept of affective style recently
has been broadened to cover sensitivities and spe‐
cific emotional responses (Hofmann & Kashdan, 2010;
Nielsen, 2018). Accordingly, one finds an affective style
when the subject is inclined, sometimes obsessively, to
notice specific developments in the environment and
to respond in a specific way to them. Ressentiment is
the affective style of impotent vengefulness: the recur‐
rent perception of injustice which the subject is unable
to retaliate, and the incapability leads to an unpleasant
general sentiment with specific effects. Each component
is crucial.
The experience of injury is recurrent. In contradis‐
tinction to a single occurrence, where the intentional
object (the actor behind the attack), the formal object
(the moral content of the injury), and the focus (its vic‐
tim; Helm, 2001, p. 34), are clear, in the cases where the
perception of injustice is recurrent, the sentiment loses
its objects and focus and, with time, only the memories
and the impression of the inevitability of injustice and
impotence remain. The objectless character of ressenti‐
ment (Hoggett et al., 2013) is favourable for professional
political communicators because they can manage the
unpleasant feelings by blaming strategically chosen fig‐
ures, delineating the moral stakes—and indeed, they are
able to define their victim at will.
It is injustice that is experienced. Injustice is a moral
experience offending not only the subject but also the
group that they feel they belong to. The victim’s iden‐
tity is, therefore, open to redefinition: The subject may
extend personal hurt to the group he/she identifies with
or may self‐victimize by identification with a suffering
group. In several cases, the feeling of injustice stems
from comparisonwith otherswho should be on the same
level but who seem better off. This component opens
opportunities for the political communicators: They may
reinterpret developments for the followers as unjust and
define the group that is the victim thereof. In case they
want to arouse ressentiment, they may obsessively put
forward comparisons between various social groups so
that the target group go through a further negative emo‐
tional episode.
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Incapability of retaliation, if enduring, may lead to
passivity. Ressentiment is directly linked to the experi‐
ence that coping is useless, it must be postponed, some‐
times even the expression of resentment is forbidden by
feeling rules and expression norms (Hochschild, 1983).
Passivity is unfavourable for the politicians who usually
want tomake citizens act: Theywant participation in elec‐
tions, demonstrations, and politics in general. On the one
hand, politicians are, therefore, interested in transform‐
ing the repressed urges into anger or hope to mobilize
the people. On the other hand, the activities should be
carried out at a specific place and time and, hence, defer‐
ment (inherent in ressentiment) is useful for them. They
may, in turn, be interested in letting people incubate
aversions in their emotional realm until the day of action.
4.2.2. The Outcomes of Ressentiment
That was the core of ressentiment, which has specific
outcomes. They depend on the subject’s personality and
the societal conditions around them. However various
the effects may be, they have a mechanism in com‐
mon: the protection of the positive image of the self.
Powerlessness and failure are painful for the subject to
admit because shame and self‐loathing may develop;
the defence mechanisms of repression and denial come
into play to protect the self. While several mechanisms
may occur, when presenting the results below I focus on
three: externalization, self‐victimization as identity work,
and transvaluation.
Externalization by blaming. One tries to believe that
something or someone else is responsible for one’s fail‐
ures. Either the arrangement of the world or some spe‐
cific person or group is behind injustice. If one feels
shame, it is because others make one do so and not
because one has done something shameful. If one is out‐
performed by others, it is because others have means
that one is denied. Suchmeans against which no one can
compete is that provided by a conspiracy: The enemies
collaborate behind the scenes whereas the subject can
only act alone.
With the personalization of politics (Bennett, 2012),
blaming people, instead of impersonal entities such as
parties, the government, or governance as a whole, is
taken for granted. The tendency is an effect and factor
of the moralization of politics: People, rather than struc‐
tures, are made morally responsible for political devel‐
opments. Even if structures are blameworthy, they can
be moralized because they serve the interests of specific
groups, whereby they are personalized.
Self‐victimization as identity work. The subjects may
try to protect themself by transforming their identity,
commonly through self‐victimization: One constructs
oneself or one’s group as the victim. If there are per‐
petrators to blame, the subject must be their victim.
Sometimes the subject develops such a strong identity
as a victim that any improvement in the world becomes
unacceptable because that would weaken the subject’s
victimization. Improvements are, hence, perceived as
deceptions, parts of some master plan, which will ulti‐
mately deteriorate the subject’s situation even more.
The professional communicators may reframe the pos‐
itive developments so that the audience feel that they
can see through them.
Transvaluation. Possibly the most sophisticated and
complicated mechanism is the revaluation of values.
The subject is unable to live up to the values such as
the power and reputation they cherish. That failure is
unbearable, and one of the solutions is to replace the val‐
ues with ones according to which the subject can be or
seems to be successful. The new values come either from
the future, far beyond the present era, a usual solution
on the political left, or from the past, leading to a specific
complex emotion: nostalgia, a usual solution on the polit‐
ical right. By transvaluation, the subjects attain moral
superiority, hence, they feel entitled to judge and criti‐
cise the previously superior rivals on moral grounds, a
position of power. In politics, transvaluation works either
by underrating the values of the previously envied rival
camp, or by overrating values of the own political com‐
munity, or both.
5. Method and Sources
So far ressentiment research has used two main meth‐
ods: surveys and deductive qualitative content analy‐
sis. The former consists of querying citizens about the
most important emotional components of ressentiment
(Capelos & Demertzis, 2018). León et al. (1988) asked
for opinions regarding 34 statements. Most of the stud‐
ies, however, followed the qualitativemethod: First, they
gave a definition of ressentiment and then looked for the
components in the texts produced by the actors (Hoggett
et al., 2013; Wimberly, 2018).
I also used the latter method. Since ressentiment is
accompanied by self‐deception, denial, and repression,
those who appeal to ressentiment may do so uncon‐
sciously; therefore, it is unlikely that the sentiment and
the political communications efforts to manage it can be
discerned directly, in contradistinction to primary emo‐
tions, such as joy, anger, or fear. I tried to find the traces
of the components and typical consequences of ressenti‐
ment in the public utterances collected.
I used a snowball procedure to collect the
data. First, I gathered the articles containing words
Kulturkampf and its Hungarian version kultúrharc pub‐
lished between the end of July 2018 and December
2020 on the most visited and/or politically most
relevant media portals: 24.hu, 168ora.hu, 444.hu,
hvg.hu, Index.hu, magyarnemzet.hu, magyaridok.hu,
Mandiner.hu, nepszava.hu, and Origo.hu. Second, I pro‐
cessed the articles and television shows the pieces cited,
thereby the corpus also covered data from the period
before the middle of July 2018. The collection con‐
tained 296 pieces. The processing consisted of search‐
ing for the components of ressentiment and for the
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communications means that have the most potential
in managing emotions stemming from ressentiment pre‐
sumably present among the targeted audience, the citi‐
zens in the political community of the political therapist.
6. Results
The objective of the research was to detect and present
communicative means that may manage citizens’ ressen‐
timent. I will, therefore, detail the political communi‐
cation of Kulturkampf according to the structure intro‐
duced in the analytical framework section above.
6.1. Hardening the Core
We saw the core of ressentiment: a recurrent perception
of injustice and powerlessness. The political communi‐
cator may be interested in inciting and maintaining the
affective state so that the audience should hoard and
incubate the necessary quantumof grievance that can be
transformed into anger and, hence, action in due course.
To do that, the communicator may appeal to any of the
three main components, as follows.
6.1.1. Recurrent Character
The theme of the leftist cultural dictatorship is recur‐
rent in the right‐wing public sphere. In 2016, a journal‐
ist very close to the prime minister, Zsolt Bayer, wrote
a 39‐piece long series of articles on the issue in the
main daily paper of the political right under the title
“Intolerable,” which suggested that the double standard
used on behalf of the leftists and liberals in general,
and of people with a Jewish background in particular,
was not to be tolerated anymore. Another leading jour‐
nalist on the right, Árpád Szakács, prepared 15 pieces
on the topic in the same daily paper in 2017 and 2018
under the heading “Whose cultural dictatorship is it?”
In 2019, the two series were published in a separate vol‐
ume (Bayer & Szakács, 2019). A poet and writer, Dénes
János Orbán, also wrote a six‐piece long series under the
title “Marginalia to Kulturkampf” in 2018. A right‐leaning
historian,Márton Békés, published a 400‐page long book
with the title “Cultural Warfare” (Békés, 2020) on the
inevitability of culture war if the political right wants to
win elections in the future.
The greater part of the articles coming from the
cultural left responded to the rightist criticisms and
accusations, and that was what made them serial, but
some dealt independently with the tendencies in the
sphere of culture. In 2017 and 2018, several articles
on the issue of finances in culture were raised by a
respected literary critic (Reményi, 2017) who dwelt on
the rightist advancement in literature and arts. The lead‐
ing daily paper of the political left, Népszava, has been
using the tag Kulturkampf since 2014 but only one arti‐
cle was tagged before the middle of 2018 whereas 31
were tagged after that time. Another tag, Kultúrharc,
shows similar numbers: a single article before our period,
whereas 52 occurred during the following two and a
half years.
It is highly unlikely that these series would have been
written if they had not resonated with their audiences.
6.1.2. Injustice
The rightist and the leftist article seriesmentioned above
are hardly more than complaints about the unfair treat‐
ment by the other side. The right laments the double
standard and the wide international visibility and reputa‐
tion of the left‐leaning artists and the much more gener‐
ous finances they get even nowwhen rightist appointees
distribute sources, which demonstrates the persistent
and unbreakable left‐liberal hegemony in culture. A poet
and journalist compares the reception of two poets
respected by the political right with the one of the writ‐
ers close to the left:
The two exceptionally great poets’ reception by the
liberal side amounts practically to zero. If anyone
wants to deny it, he ought to present and compare
the bibliography of works on Esterházy and Nádas
with the ones on Faludy and Kányádi, and add the
comparative lists of the university master theses as
well….It is a bad argument to say that the opportu‐
nities are equal because the national camp has had
exceptionally great sums for years, which it should
have usedmuch better; the issue does not depend on
money, rather on mentality, the attitude of the peo‐
ple should be changed. (Orbán, 2018)
The left‐leaning and liberal authors also monitor the
support the leftist organisations obtain vis‐a‐vis the
rightist ones and they also find the other camp unde‐
servedly better off particularly when comparing cultural
performances. Both sides eagerly calculate how much
they have lost to their counterparts in terms of money
and influence.
6.1.3. Powerlessness
Communicators on the cultural left often mention the
two‐third majority of the right‐wing coalition in the
parliament and the aggressive way in which the right
prefers to use its power both in legislation and personnel
changes in culture. A left‐leaning author, Gergely Péterfy,
wrote on Orbán’s regime:
The regime… is establishing its own network of insti‐
tutions where revolutionary ideology is compulsory
and where a class of clowns has been made aristoc‐
racy. In that parallel universe of the regime, which
is the network of academies, universities, research
institutes and journals that suffocate the institutions
of democratic and European traditions by their abun‐
dance of money, suspends the validity of discourses
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the normal part of the world has been indulged in.
(Péterfy, 2017)
As shown in the quotation in Section 6.1.2, the rightist
public figures claim that the huge influence of the left‐
liberals stems from the communist era, which now is
backed by European and US support. They say that the
indoctrination by the Marxist and later by the postmod‐
ern cultural elites, coming practically from the same cir‐
cles, has had such a persistent influence on thementality
and attitude of the audience that it is an almost impossi‐
ble mission for the cultural right to make changes in the
short term.
6.2. Repression and Outcomes
Ressentiment leads to specific changes in the emotional
realm. The subjects do not want to admit responsi‐
bility, rather deny or repress any acknowledgement
of any blame they may share for causing their own
unpleasant experience. The subjects, therefore, protects
their self‐image by specific defence mechanisms. Here,
I am presenting three directions the mechanisms can
take: externalization, self‐victimization as identity work,
and transvaluation.
6.2.1. Externalization by Blaming
Both camps name the people responsible for the deterio‐
ration of culture in Hungary. They are painted as demonic
figures coming from the cultural elites; they have, there‐
fore, betrayed high culture in general, and art in par‐
ticular, by joining political groups. For the left, all the
rightists participating in Kulturkampf are guilty because
they have the government behind them, thereby they let
the government have a say in the development of cul‐
ture. The right considers the canon makers of the cul‐
tural left are to blame for excluding their favoured great
artists. Even if their parties are not powerful politically,
the cultural elite has inherited authority and domestic
and international networks from the past, whereby it has
a huge influence.
In rightist public communication, the political and cul‐
tural left systematically tries to put the political and cul‐
tural right to shame. In the autumn of 2020, well‐known
artists fromCate Blanchett to RobertWilson declared sol‐
idarity with the cause of the students who were revolt‐
ing against the government’s measures to re‐establish
the University of Theatre and Film Arts Budapest and
the plans to appoint new principals mainly from among
the right‐leaning artists. Meanwhile, the rightist journal‐
ists explained this international protestation as being the
result of a conspiracy on the left to destroy Hungary’s
image and to shame and humiliate the country abroad.
The leftist communication, in turn, interpreted the case
of the University as an explicitly political move by the
government against cultural values. Although the new
appointees in charge of the University used to be great
artists in the past, the leftist discourse says, they lost
their talent when they joined the efforts of the govern‐
ment and Viktor Orbán personally and accepted the task
of conducting a rightist occupation of culture.
6.2.2. Identity Work: Self‐Victimization
A left‐leaning journalist and writer wrote an indignant
article against the generous scholarship a government‐
financed public institution granted to writers and poets
from both political camps:
Last time Iwas shockedby the story of the Térey schol‐
arship. Lay persons may appreciate the idea: Let’s
support the Hungarian writers with a major grant for
period that is long enough to produce a great work.
But the real purpose is again to divide, divide the
Hungarian literature in this case, to spoil the so far
credible voices, to demonstrate that the champions
of morality also go after the fat bit. (Karafiáth, 2020)
Thewriter was unable to accept that anything favourable
could happen. Positive developments are but traps to
compromise the artists critical towards the governance
of the political right.
The communicators on the political right also insist
on their identity as a victim. Although their political par‐
ties have won every parliamentary, local, and European
election since the middle of 2006—and even though
Fidesz, the large right‐leaning party, has been the most
popular according to opinion polls since that time—they
still recurrentlywrite about the right’s bleak future, given
the leftist and liberal cultural hegemony. There is a con‐
spicuous self‐contradiction in the discourse: They simul‐
taneously claim that it is impossible to win in politics
without cultural hegemony, and they boast of their vic‐
tories since 2010. It is hardly possible to avoid the con‐
clusion that they lay claim to the identity of the victim
and that of the victor at the same time.
6.2.3. Transvaluation
The two camps have a specific transvaluation discourse
in common: Both claim that the other exerts political
power in the culture at the expense of authentic artis‐
tic worth.
The cultural right accuses the rival party of ignoring
and excluding great achievements several authors out‐
side the canon produced. The discourse explains that
since the cultural canon is based on political power and
not on merit, political power is necessary to change the
situation otherwise the old canon and canon makers
wouldmaintain a false hierarchy. This is indeed transvalu‐
ation: The cultural right perceives injustice from the side
of the canon, wants to be appreciated by the canon mak‐
ers, but being unable to reach that, it judges the canon
wrong, not worth trying to get into. Sometimes the lat‐
ter disparagement takes the form of underrating works
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by leftist artists as meaningless and unenjoyable for
the Hungarian people, which is not surprising because
the so‐called Europeanness and liberalism on the base
of which they are produced have become outdated
and irrelevant:
When you have to work according to the regula‐
tions of political correctness, you will think it over
whether to write erotic love poems or whether you
are allowed to let your humour show, and whether
you are free to choose topic at all. It is far from
easy to write and live foreseeing that if you make a
mistake, if you meddle with something delicate, you
will be excommunicated and financial and publication
opportunities will shrink for you. (Orbán, 2018)
The other camp also insists on the principle of meritoc‐
racy and denies the existence of any canon or political
consideration in judging works. The left‐leaning commu‐
nicators point at the politically motivated invasion by
the government’s appointees and favourites in culture,
which threatens the sphere with bad art gaining ground.
A cameraman says in an interview: “This regime thinks
talents can be appointed. In contradistinction to them,
although knowing that talents were not loyal, Kádár and
his staff gave them some space.” (Kardos, 2020). Still,
from time to time, even left‐leaning public intellectuals
admit that there is a canon, a rather questionable one
(Kőbányai, 2018), and that the canon makers have had a
long‐standing alliancewith politicians of the late socialist
and liberal parties.
7. Conclusion
Although I have had space to present only a couple
of components and outcomes of ressentiment, it was
not difficult to find communicative means that could
be traced back to, and which capitalize on, the affec‐
tive style. One could see the obsessive sensitivities
towards the signs of injustice, the discourses on pow‐
erlessness, and the outcomes of ressentiment: transval‐
uation, self‐contradiction, self‐victimization, and scape‐
goating. The recurrent deployment of these means can
be explained by their efficiency, which, in turn, verifies
the premise of the hypothesis of the research: The polit‐
ical communication on Kulturkampf took advantage of
the ressentiment present among the citizens.
The hypothesis also foresaw the existence of dou‐
ble ressentiment, that is, the possibility that two politi‐
cal communities have ressentiment towards each other
at the same time. Indeed, the research could detect
the components of ressentiment and means to man‐
age it in the activities of both political camps. A great
part of their communicative efforts was invested in the
emotional episodes that maintained and oriented the
affective processes feeding ressentiment and the out‐
comes of the impotent revenge were directed towards
the other camp.
Following Nietzsche or Scheler and supported by
the research on Kulturkampf, one may conclude that
ressentiment offers a plausible analytical framework to
study a considerable part of political communication pro‐
cesses in Hungary and presumably in other democratic
European countries facing a culture war. Ressentiment
is a psychological resource politicians and public com‐
municators can rely on to mobilize citizens for a spe‐
cific purpose. Being indeterminate regarding objects and
focus, it opens a large space for politicians to manoeu‐
vre. In the framework of a special political therapy, they
can offer threats and hopes, ways of deferment and out‐
burst, conspiracies of scapegoats, and the sharing of vic‐
timhood. This is a therapy also in the sense that the suc‐
cess depends on the personalities and sensitivities of the
citizens and their groups: Some accept threats that face
them as explanation for their discontent; some need the
scapegoats on which to project their frustration; others
find relief in self‐victimization; and further groups con‐
sider their bad feelings legitimate and only to be acted
upon when they are informed that others are also hurt.
There aremany combinations that existwithin this collec‐
tion, all of which are capable of appealing and uniting citi‐
zens in one single political community: an in‐group based
on ressentiment.
More specifically, in the Hungarian case, one can
see twofold ressentiment in another sense as well. Both
camps nurtured ressentiment in two fields, but each
focussed mainly on one of them: The political right
concentrated on culture whereas the political left on
party politics. Rightist communicators tried to manage
the citizens’ ressentiment by raising cultural injuries and
grievance,whereas the cultural left did the same alluding
to the political deficiencies of the ruling right as reflected
by an un‐European eagerness to occupy culture. Each
invested in the other field as well. The cultural left fore‐
saw oppression and the deterioration of culture due to
the political preponderance of the right, whereas right‐
leaning communicators repeated that the cultural hege‐
mony of the political left and liberals might result in their
political prevalence in the long run.
We, hence, see a twofold double ressentiment: There
are two fields where communicative means can be used
tomanage ressentiment, and there are two political com‐
munities in Hungary, just as in some other countries,
which are receptive to specific efforts of affect manage‐
ment. One may conclude that in cases where a politi‐
cal force is in power for a prolonged period, and partic‐
ularly if it has a huge majority which causes recurrent
frustration amongst the rest of the political elite and
its voters, coupled with the urge to avoid facing failure
and not to attribute it to the losing side’s weakness, its
elite and audience may survive the hard times by finding
superiority in some non‐political realm, such as, in this
case, culture.
The research and the article have limitations. The
first being that only one country and one case served
to test the hypothesis. More cases would have resulted
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in more nuanced knowledge on the political communi‐
cation of Kulturkampf and its use in managing ressenti‐
ment. Secondly, triangulation through the analysis of cit‐
izens’ reception would increase the validity and general‐
izability of the analytical framework. Thirdly, on another
level of analysis, the prototypical indicator nouns and
narratives used to detect the components of ressenti‐
ment could be broadened according to a more compre‐
hensive approach to, and definition of, ressentiment.
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